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STABILITY OF THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE. TOWARD AN EVOLUTIONIST EPISTEMOLOGY,
WITHOUT REFUTATIONS AND REVOLUTIONS
Formulating hypothesis from the observation and testing it through
experiment is what characterizes the Baconian method; the initial
formulation was an explicit result from an intuitive insight that Francis
Bacon called induction. Objectivity is in the beginning of the knowledge
process, the scientist has only to let facts talk for themselves while he
reads the open book of nature.
A more sophisticated form of inductivism makes a distinction
between discovery context and justification context so as to distinguish
the way the scientific theories are developed from the way they are tested
against their rivals. Karl Popper, disagreeing with this attitude, will
attribute the first one to a chance while the second will assume an
evolutionist epistemology.
Popper, not believing in the possibility of the existence of a truth
criteria, proposes a falsiable one. Knowledge would not be formed
through generalizations from the experiment, but through the elaboration
of high empiric content conjectures that would be submitted to deductive
logics (based on modus tolles) and experiment. Popper, under Humean
influence, denies any role of induction in knowledge aquisition, that
would not come either from perceptions or from observations or data
collection, but from problems. In the lack of conclusive criteria of the
empiric truth, we simply have to learn from our mistakes. The progress
of knowledge would come from the refusal to a hypothesis and the search
for a better explained content that could avoid at least some of the previous
hypothesis faults. This would be the scientific progress criteria.
The problem about Popper’s falsificationists is that the scientist does
not pursue theories in order to prove they are false, but theories that he
tries to show as true. Popper tells us what the ideal of science would be,
but not the way it is practiced.
Isolated, both inductivism and the hypothetico-deductive method
are simplistic and naive. The first one is blind, does not direct the
experiment by theorical hypothesis. The second has theorical redirection,
but does not take into account the hypothesis generation. As both stand
on the same side in the description of the relationship between the
experiment and the theory, this makes this double-sided interaction
valuable. The theory of germs and the discovery of penicillin is subjected
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